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20 June 1995

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 13 June 1995

1. Attendees included Sandy Berger and Nelson Drew for NSC, Dave Scheffer for US/UN, General Wesley Clarke for JCS, John Klikus for OSD, Leon Fuerth and Rick Saunders for the Office of the Vice President, Peter Tarnoff and Bob Frasure for State, and Admiral Studeman for CIA.
2. The Deputies discussed the present situation in Bosnia, particularly regarding the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with an eye to keeping Bosnia from becoming an object of dissension at the Halifax Summit about to begin. The Administration had been warned by Congress of the need to consult before the US voted in favor of the Rapid Reaction Force or else risk getting no funding. The French and British, however, were opposed to further delays on the UN vote. President Chirac of France wanted to learn from the President the next day how the US planned to vote on this resolution. The group agreed on the difficulty of resolving the funding issue in the next few days. The Deputies agreed to tell Chirac that the Administration generally views the RRF favorably, but as a democracy it is essential for prior Congressional consultations before making a commitment. If he pressed too hard, it would be necessary for the Administration to back pedal on this commitment.
3. A State representative noted that Vice President of the Federation had told our charge that the Bosnians would launch a major offensive in the next four-five days (presumably by 17 June) to secure Sarajevo. They planned to attack both inward and outward from Sarajevo and to try to secure the Mount Igman road. Supposedly the Bosnian Army had already infiltrated 4,000 troops into Sarajevo. The Bosnians told the charge that they were launching this offensive because of the collapse of the UN mandate, the breakdown of the talks with Milosevic, and that Sarajevo could not endure another winter. Some Deputies speculated the timing was calculated to ensure Bosnia received high visibility at the G-7 Summit.
4. There was considerable discussion among the Deputies about what action to take regarding this offensive. Basically it appeared there was little leverage to press the Bosnians to halt the offensive. The Deputies also mentioned that Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic in his meetings around town had emphasized that they are "entitled" to US air support for air cover because of their toleration of the arms embargo for three years. To some it appeared that the Bosnian Government was trying to make the US its ally, an action that seemed likely to raise concerns in Congress. The Deputies concluded that the best the US could do is to warn that if the offensive goes badly, then they are on their


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own. Someone suggested getting supporters of Bosnia in the Congress to urge them to use restraint, but this idea was discarded.

5. The Deputies also expressed concern that the Rapid Reaction Force would not lead to the more robust UNPROFOR originally anticipated, but still would cost some \$300 million. They were also concerned to find that Akashi is still involved in the decision process and skeptical that he could be eased out. Others feared that the RRF is really a preliminary to extracting UNPROFOR by implementing OPLAN 40104. Boutros-Ghali reportedly had told President Carter that UNPROFOR would leave Bosnia within the next six months.

6. The Deputies agreed that there were risks of giving too much authority to the replacement for Lord Owen--Karl Bildt--and essentially reducing the role of Bob Frasure and the US in the Contact Group. He might go too far under European pressure in offers to Milosevic or in establishing contacts with the Bosnian Serbs. It was felt, however, this would keep other negotiators from entering the scene and messing up negotiations. They agreed that Bildt would receive our support but he would not be given a mandate and also he should not meet with Pale as long as the Bosnian Serbs hold hostages.



Ray Converse

Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force



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